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The Pentagon Papers the Defense Department History of United States Decisionmaking on Vietnam
Author: United States Department of Defense
Year: 1971
Pages: 764
Format: PDF
File size: 61 MB
Language: ENG

Year: 1971
Pages: 764
Format: PDF
File size: 61 MB
Language: ENG

The Pentagon Papers: The Defense Department History of United States Decisionmaking on Vietnam, written by Dr. Daniel Ellsberg and Professor Edward Kennedy, is a comprehensive history of the United States' involvement in the Vietnam War, from the early stages of US involvement to the final withdrawal of troops. The book provides a detailed account of the decision-making processes within the US government, military, and intelligence agencies, highlighting the complexities and contradictions of the war effort. It also offers insights into the motivations and actions of key figures such as President Lyndon B. Johnson, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, and General William Westmoreland. The book begins with an overview of the historical context of the Vietnam War, including the political and social climate of the time, and the evolution of US policy towards the conflict. It then delves into the details of the US military strategy, including the use of napalm, Agent Orange, and the bombing of civilian targets, which had devastating effects on both the Vietnamese people and the environment. The authors argue that these tactics were not only morally reprehensible but also ineffective in achieving their intended goals. One of the most significant contributions of the book is its analysis of the role of technology in the war effort.
The Pentagon Papers: The Defense Department History of United States Decisionmaking on Vietnam, writed by Dr. Daniel Ellsberg and Professor Edward Kennedy, is a comprehensive history of the United States's involvement in the Vietnam War, from the early stages of United to the final exuction of militations. В книге подробно рассказывается о процессах принятия решений в правительстве США, военных и разведывательных органах, освещаются сложности и противоречия военных усилий. Он также предлагает понимание мотивов и действий ключевых фигур, таких как президент Линдон Б. Джонсон, министр обороны Роберт Макнамара и генерал Уильям Уэстморленд. Книга начинается с обзора исторического контекста войны во Вьетнаме, включая политический и социальный климат того времени, и эволюцию политики США в отношении конфликта. Затем он углубляется в детали военной стратегии США, включая использование напалма, Agent Orange и бомбардировки гражданских объектов, которые оказали разрушительное воздействие как на вьетнамский народ, так и на окружающую среду. Авторы утверждают, что эта тактика была не только морально предосудительной, но и неэффективной в достижении намеченных целей. Одним из наиболее значительных вкладов книги является анализ роли технологий в военных усилиях.
The Pentagon Papers: The Defense Department History of United States Decisionmaking on Vietnam, writed by Dr. Daniel Ellsberg and Professor Edward Kennedy, is a comprehensive history of the United States's involvement in the Vietnam War, from the early stages of United to the final exuction of militations. Il libro descrive in dettaglio i processi decisionali del governo degli Stati Uniti, delle agenzie militari e di intelligence, e mette in luce le difficoltà e le contraddizioni degli sforzi militari. Suggerisce inoltre di comprendere le motivazioni e le azioni di figure chiave come il presidente Lyndon B. Johnson, il segretario alla difesa Robert McNamara e il generale William Westmoreland. Il libro inizia con una panoramica del contesto storico della guerra in Vietnam, compreso il clima politico e sociale dell'epoca, e l'evoluzione della politica americana in materia di conflitto. Poi approfondisce i dettagli della strategia militare degli Stati Uniti, tra cui l'uso di napalm, Agente Orange e i bombardamenti su siti civili che hanno avuto effetti devastanti sia sul popolo vietnamita che sull'ambiente. Gli autori sostengono che questa tattica non è stata solo moralmente dannosa, ma anche inefficace nel raggiungere gli obiettivi prefissati. Uno dei contributi più importanti del libro è l'analisi del ruolo della tecnologia negli sforzi militari.
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